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Abstract 
This paper presents some of the findings of our Mapping Paths to Family Justice research 
with regard to out-of-court settlements in financial cases, considering what parties and 
practitioners respectively bring to the process of dispute resolution, and how outcomes are 
influenced by practitioners’ and parties’ contributions. Practitioners play an important role 
in determining the extent to which the ‘shadow of the law’ falls on out-of-court dispute 
resolution, and this might vary by the type of dispute resolution process and the individual 
practitioner’s views, but is also complicated by the fact that the law’s shadow in a highly 
discretionary system may be distinctly hazy. Parties, in turn, bring to the process their own 
normative conceptions of a fair outcome, which are markedly gendered. Outcomes thus 
tend to be a function of the interaction between the respective norms of the parties, their 
respective needs to settle and willingness or compulsion to compromise, and the nature and 
direction of practitioner (non-) intervention. Despite these complexities and the range of 
individual circumstances, some clear patterns of outcomes were observed, some of which 




The discretionary nature of the current law in England and Wales concerning financial 
remedies has come to be perceived as a significant problem. Indeed, several of the papers in 
this special issue suggest it is the major problem or challenge in the area of financial 
remedies. Hence, there have been increasing calls for reform in order to create greater 
certainty for divorcing couples – not only for those who go to court, but also – or perhaps 
especially – for those wishing or finding it necessary to settle out of court. The excessively 
hazy nature of the law’s shadow is said to impede private ordering, a difficulty thought to be 
exacerbated following the cuts to legal aid effected by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
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Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), when more and more people are reliant on 
private ordering in order to reach post-separation financial arrangements.1 
 The centrality of law to family dispute resolution in financial cases is open to 
question, however. The notion that people are left floundering about how to divide up their 
finances because the law fails to give them sufficient direction posits both a linear and a 
necessary relationship between legal doctrine and financial outcomes. But this fails to 
capture two important elements of the dynamics of financial dispute settlement. The first of 
these elements is the norms parties bring to the table with them, and the social and 
relationship dynamics within which those norms are formulated and advanced.2 The second 
is the role of practitioners in mediating or channelling the shadow of the law to their clients. 
Where practitioners are involved, the law is what practitioners represent it to be,3 and 
agreement arises out of the interaction between parties’ norms and practitioner 
representations. Where practitioners are not involved, parties’ own norms and relationship 
dynamics are played out untrammelled. If reform to the law of financial remedies is 
contemplated, this is the picture against which such reform needs to be considered. 
 In this article we use data from the Mapping Paths to Family Justice project to 
illustrate and flesh out these points, and to consider the kinds of patterns of financial 
1 See, e.g. Baroness Deech’s explanation for the introduction of her private member’s bill, the 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill (HL Bill 21, 2016-17), quoted in House of Lords Library, In Focus: 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]: Briefing for Lords Stages (2017), available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LIF-2017-0004 (accessed 26 
January 2018). 
2 See e.g. Simon Duncan and Rosalind Edwards, Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral 
Rationalities (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Anne Barlow and Simon Duncan, ‘Supporting Families? 
New Labour’s Communitarianism and the “Rationality Mistake”: Part I’ (2000) 22 Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 23. 
3 See e.g. Becky Batagol and Thea Brown, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Family 
Mediation (Themis Press, 2011) 259, 264, 270; Austin Sarat and William LF Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers 
and their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (OUP, 1995). 
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settlements that result.4 The research investigated out-of-court family dispute resolution 
processes and outcomes in England and Wales in both children’s and financial matters 
between 1996 and 2014. While the focus was on disputes resolved by solicitor negotiations, 
mediation and/or collaborative law, we also gained insights into cases where none of these 
dispute resolution methods were used and into cases which proceeded to court. Three 
methods of data gathering were used: national surveys of the general public and of people 
who had experienced separation or divorce in the relevant time period; interviews with 
parties who had experienced one or more dispute resolution processes (n=95) and with 
practitioners providing those processes (n=40); and observations of a small sample of 
mediation and collaborative law processes and lawyer-client first interviews. The method of 
observation was to record (rather than be present in) the relevant session/s and then to 
read, collectively discuss and analyse the transcripts of the recordings. This paper draws 
mainly on interview data, supplemented by the observational data which gave a real flavour 
of the dynamics of dispute resolution processes as well as reality checks on what parties and 
practitioners said in their interviews. Although the majority of interviews were conducted 
and sessions were recorded before LASPO came into force, there is no reason to believe 
that LASPO would have changed the normative landscape, as opposed to the numbers of 
cases with lawyer, mediator, court or no practitioner involvement.5  
 
Parties’ norms 
4 The Project was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Grant no ES/I031812/1. A 
fuller account can be found in our book, Anne Barlow, Rosemary Hunter, Janet Smithson and Jan 
Ewing, Mapping Paths to Family Justice: Resolving Family Disputes in Neoliberal Times (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017). 
5 See also Emma Hitching and Joanna Miles, ‘Mediation, Financial Remedies, Information Provision 
and Legal Advice: The Post-LASPO Conundrum’ (2016) 38 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
175. 
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In interviews we asked parties what they had thought would be a fair outcome for their 
dispute, and whether they thought the outcome achieved was fair. Not all parties answered 
these questions or answered them directly. For those who did answer, we identified themes 
in the responses and categorised responses according to those themes. In some cases, the 
answers also enabled us to categorise the position held by the party’s ex-partner, as they 
described what they had both wanted or sources of disagreement between them. Similarly, 
we read over the transcripts of the recorded sessions, identified statements made by parties 
which indicated their conceptions of a fair outcome, and categorised those statements 
within the same themes.  In some cases, parties’ statements or accounts fell within more 
than one theme.  In these cases we did not attempt to identify a single or dominant norm 
held by each party but coded for each of the themes they expressed.  
The range of norms expressed by parties included both material and emotional or 
moral norms, that is, norms as to the basis on which finances should be distributed, and 
views and feelings concerning their own or the other party’s behaviour which drove their 
sense of a fair outcome. Material norms in financial matters included:  
• formal equality: a 50/50 split of financial assets 
• primary carer: an outcome making adequate provision for the party who would be 
the primary carer of the children (in all cases in which this norm was articulated the 
primary carer was the mother); this was closely associated with 
• needs: an outcome which met the party’s future financial needs; and 
• child welfare: an outcome that was perceived to be in the best interests of the 
parties’ children  
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• contributions: an outcome reflecting the parties’ direct financial contributions, which 
included parties wanting to keep assets perceived as ‘theirs’, especially pensions6  
• compensation: an outcome compensating the party for something they had given up 
in the interests of the family or relationship (such as a full-time job, career or 
occupational pension). 
All of these norms align with various legal rules and principles found in s 25 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and in the leading case law,7 but that is because legal rules 
and principles reflect basic social notions of fairness rather than the other way around. The 
discipline imposed by the law on this ‘normal chaos’8 is that it decides when particular 
norms should be prioritised or are inappropriate – a degree of nuance not generally 
reflected in parties’ positions. Very few parties, however, articulated an express desire to 
order their finances in accordance with what the law might dictate. 
In addition to these socio-legal norms, parties were influenced by emotional and 
moral norms,9 most of which no longer find legal analogues, although they may have in the 
past. These included: 
• punishment: an outcome which included some element of punishment of the other 
party for their role in ending the relationship 
• reasonableness: an outcome that was fair to the other party 
6 See also Jane Mair, Fran Wasoff and Kirsteen Mackay, ‘Family Justice Without Courts: Property 
Settlement on Separation Using Contracts in Scotland’, in Mavis Maclean, John Eekelaar and Benoit 
Bastard (eds), Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2015) 175, 195. 
7 White v White [2001] 1 AC 596; Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618. 
8 John Dewar, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 467. 
9 This point has also been noted by Sue Arthur, Jane Lewis, Mavis Maclean, Steven Finch and Rory 
Fitzgerald, Settling Up: Making Financial Arrangements after Divorce or Separation (National Centre 
for Social Research, 2002) 72; Emma Hitchings, Joanna Miles and Hilary Woodward, Assembling the 
Jigsaw Puzzle: Financial Settlements on Divorce (University of Bristol, 2013). 
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• guilt: an outcome which reflected the party’s guilt about their own role in ending the 
relationship, one more generous to the other party than might otherwise have been 
the case 
• pragmatism: a party’s preparedness to settle for what they could get, regardless of 
whether it reflected their needs or legal entitlements 
• sacrifice: a party’s willingness consciously to settle for less than they may have been 
able to achieve in order to maintain good relations with the other party or pursue 
some other objective they considered more important 
• self-preservation: the party felt intimidated or highly stressed by the negotiation 
process and was prepared to agree to anything to get it over with. 
 The predominant norms expressed by the parties and their former partners were 
clearly gendered.  The predominant norm expressed by wives10 in financial matters was the 
desire to meet their future needs, usually due to their status as the children’s primary carer. 
After needs, the next largest group of wives expressed the norm of formal equality. 
However, women were also more likely than men to have mixed feelings and to bring in a 
range of normative considerations to their financial disputes, including feelings of guilt, 
pragmatism, sacrifice or self-preservation, concerns about compensation or a desire for 
reasonableness, which were rarely put forward by men.11 For example, Kim wanted to be 
reasonable about finances and agreed to the return of a deposit paid by her ex-partner, 
despite her solicitor’s advice that this was not necessary. Kay agreed to the transfer of the 
10 The matrimonial property regime in England and Wales applies only to divorcing couples, i.e. 
those who were formerly wives and husbands. Cohabitants dividing property on separation are 
subject to the general law of property and equity. 
11 Previous studies which have made similar observations include Batagol and Brown, above n 3; 
Christine Piper, The Responsible Parent: A Study in Divorce Mediation (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
See also Trina Grillo, ‘The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women’ (1991) 100 Yale Law 
Journal 1545. 
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former matrimonial home to her ex-husband on payment of a small lump sum because she 
‘felt so guilty that [she] had left’, regardless of the reservations expressed by both the 
mediator and the District Judge. Patty ‘gave up the house’ because her ex-husband refused 
to hand over their child’s passport to allow her to leave the country. She explained that ‘I 
just wanted to be done and dusted and I caved in… At the time it was expedient… I just did 
what I needed to do and got out of it’.  
The predominant norms expressed by husbands in financial matters were formal 
equality and contributions. Men expressed the norm of formal equality twice as often as 
women. Moreover, they often expressed the two norms of formal equality and 
contributions together, as in a willingness to split the value of the matrimonial home 50/50 
but a desire to retain all of their pension. This normative gender difference of course 
reflects Smart and Neale’s observation that in the process of reconstituting the post-
separation family, women tend to think in terms of an ethic of care and responsibility while 
men tend to think in terms of formal equality and rights.12 
 In addition to gender difference, we also found a process difference, in that the 
norm of primary carer’s needs was often raised in solicitor negotiations and mediation but 
hardly raised at all in collaborative law. Conversely, parties were substantially more likely to 
bring norms of formal equality and contributions into collaborative law. This most likely 
reflects demographic differences, with parties using collaborative law having fewer, older 
children and tending to be at the end of longer and wealthier relationships on average than 
those using solicitor negotiations or mediation. Other background normative differences 
may have contributed to the choice of process, for example the norm of reasonableness was 
12 Carol Smart and Bren Neale, Family Fragments? (Polity Press, 1999); see also Mair et al., above n 
6, 195. 
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somewhat more likely to be brought into mediation than into solicitor negotiations, while 
the process of screening out unsuitable cases from mediation and the status of solicitor 
negotiations at the time of the research as the default option for more ‘difficult’ disputes 
may have resulted in the emotional norms of pragmatism and sacrifice being found 
somewhat more often in solicitor negotiations than in mediation.  
 
The role of practitioners 
The law on financial remedies is not, of course, a matter of complete but of bounded 
discretion, involving application of case law principles and statutory factors to the 
circumstances of the particular case. The degrees of freedom increase the more sources of 
wealth there are, but in a great many cases the legal room for manoeuvre is limited.  
Representations of the law by dispute resolution practitioners, however, fell on a spectrum 
from wholly indeterminate to fairly certain and predictable. This meant practitioners giving 
parties less or more guidance or steering with regard to their legal position, with the result 
that the shadow of the law fell fairly lightly through to quite heavily depending on the 
practitioner’s preferred approach.13  
 Practitioners’ orientations in fact operated along two axes, one concerning the 
conduct of dispute resolution (what role they thought the law ought to have in the process) 
and the other concerning the outcomes of dispute resolution (what kind of agreements they 
were prepared to countenance). In terms of the process, practitioners ranged from negative 
13 See also Hitchings and Miles, above n 5. The phrase ‘the shadow of the law’ inevitably invokes the 
famous article by Robert H Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. For the purposes of this article, however, the 
phrase is used descriptively to refer to the extent to which legal norms are influential in the 
negotiation process, rather than intending to import or to contribute to debates concerning the 
detail of Mnookin and Kornhauser’s bargaining theory. 
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representations of law, through ‘norm educating’, to being quite directive about what a 
court would expect. In terms of outcomes, they ranged from giving absolute priority to party 
autonomy14 through to benchmarking the agreement against what a court would be likely 
to order. In combination, practitioners could be broadly divided into four groups: hands-off, 
mild-to-moderately interventionist, moderate-to-significantly interventionist and directive. 
At the hands-off end of the spectrum several collaborative practitioners and 
mediators we interviewed and observed represented the law to clients strategically as 
something that is unhelpful and therefore to be avoided. Here the uncertainty of the law 
and the unpredictability of discretionary decision-making, far from being seen as an 
impediment to settlement, was used to promote settlement. In the words of one lawyer in 
the course of a collaborative meeting: 
Well who knows, toss a coin what the law says because we have got such a 
discretionary system in this country, you can argue until the cows come home, you 
know. And that’s why kind of in a sense law is helpful on one level but very unhelpful 
on another. (Clarissa Chesterton,15 recorded collaborative process 214) 
Or as stated to the parties by a mediator:  
What I can say [about going to court] is it is an uncertain outcome. I guarantee 
neither of you will predict the outcome because it depends on evidence, it depends 
on six months of statements and witnesses and a barrister and the judge on the day, 
14 All forms of private ordering, and mediation in particular, are promoted on the basis that they 
respect and enhance party autonomy, a highly valued commodity within liberal societies. There is an 
extensive literature debating both the priority given to party autonomy and the precise meaning and 
requirements of autonomy in the legal and dispute resolution context. One of the best discussions in 
relation to family law is by Sharon Thompson in Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free 
Choice (Hart Publishing, 2015). It is not the purpose of this article to engage directly with these 
debates but rather to show how the idea of autonomy is (or is not) operationalised in dispute 
resolution processes, and the implications for parties and outcomes. 
15 All names of practitioners and parties are pseudonyms. 
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the opinion. … Well, you ask your lawyer, ask your solicitors, ‘Can you guarantee me 
an outcome?’ And if they can’t, then that’s why mediation is the way to go. If they 
can’t guarantee an outcome…  (Peter Young, recorded mediation 207) 
Another mediator told us she had ‘certain little visuals, sort of analogies that I use, painting 
pictures that I hope help [clients] to remember things’. One of these was ‘Twelve different 
District Judges in a room with the same set of facts come out with 13 different decisions’ 
(Jane Davison). While the collaborative lawyers interviewed saw one of the advantages of 
collaborative law, compared to mediation, as being their ability to give legal advice directly 
as part of the process, they also stressed that what a court would decide in the particular 
case was not the primary focus of negotiations. As one collaborative lawyer put it, clients 
usually sign up to the collaborative process because they want to come to an agreement 
that is more creative than a court-ordered outcome (Matthew King).  
Collaborative lawyers were most prominent among the group espousing total 
adherence to party autonomy in relation to outcomes, accompanied by a minority of 
mediators (all from legal backgrounds). One collaborative lawyer acknowledged that what 
the court might order would influence her perception of a good outcome, but ‘the 
collaborative process has taught me to let go of that to a certain extent’ (Rachel Matthews). 
So long as the client understands the long-term implications of their decisions and does not 
feel pressurised, it is up to them if they choose to reach an agreement which is outside the 
parameters of what a court is likely to order. Another said he would consider the likely court 
outcome as a bare minimum safety net, but collaborative law worked at a different level, 
with the parties’ aspirations rather than court outcomes being the guiding principles (David 
Leighton).  
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The mild-to-moderately interventionist group was also primarily comprised of 
mediators and collaborative lawyers. They tended to operate according to a touchstone of 
‘fairness’ which they would use mentally to assess any proposed agreements, but may not 
articulate directly to the parties. For example, one of the recorded collaborative cases (213) 
involved an older couple with no dependent children separating by mutual agreement, and 
resulted in an equal division of assets and a clean break. In this case, the lawyers provided 
very little explicit legal advice, other than on the specific issue of inherited property. Since 
the parties arrived by their own devices at an outcome the practitioners considered to be 
fair, there seemed little need for direct legal intervention. Some mediators said they would 
assess the proposed agreement against what a court would order and if they thought it was 
too favourable to one party, they would try to get the parties to look at it from each other’s 
perspectives, caucus with the parties separately to try to understand their motivations for 
the agreement, tell them a court would be unlikely to make such an order and/or suggest 
the need for legal advice.  
Two mediators commented on the need to explain the principles of fairness to 
parties in financial cases, in terms of needs, contributions and equal sharing.16 One of these 
noted the tension between men’s expectations of formal equality and legal notions of 
fairness: 
16 The leading case of White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 established the principle that the overall aim of 
the law in this area is to achieve fairness between the parties. The subsequent case of Miller v Miller; 
McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 elaborated on how fairness between the parties was to be 
achieved, by reference to the consideration of needs, compensation and equal sharing (in that 
order). In practice, ‘small money’ cases (in which needs exceed assets) are decided by reference to 
needs, while ‘big money’ cases (in which assets exceed needs) are decided by reference to equal 
sharing, with compensation playing a somewhat muted role in between. There is much less 
emphasis on contributions in the English law compared to Australian law, with contributions in 
marriages of reasonable duration more or less assumed to be equal. White v White also established 
that there must be no discrimination between economic / breadwinner and non-economic / 
homemaker contributions. 
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The problem is that people don't always appreciate that…just because, you know, 
you have got a house that is jointly owned, you don't have to share it 50/50.  That 
seems to be obviously what a lot of men in particular think is going to be the 
outcome, and of course you have to say ‘well, it isn’t necessarily the case and what 
we need to do is to take into account of all the factors that the law says you should 
take into account before a decision is made’ and erm, that often means it isn’t quite 
as equal as they would like it to be… (Mike Carter) 
Likewise, some collaborative lawyers would ‘have conversations about fairness’ (Richard 
Benson) if they felt a proposed agreement diverged from this standard. A good illustration 
of such a conversation occurred in one of our recorded collaborative processes (204), in 
which the husband, Gary, was happy to share the proceeds of the sale of the house equally 
but wanted to maintain all other assets and liabilities as they stood. That would leave him 
with his pension intact and the wife, Sandra, with a substantial debt incurred in her name 
but used for the welfare of the family. Moreover, Gary would be buying a new house while 
Sandra, who worked part-time, would be going into rented accommodation with the 
children and would remain as the primary carer. Both lawyers made an effort to convince 
Gary that such an outcome would be perceived as unfair, by reference to the court’s 
approach and the risk that the court would not accept a consent order embodying such an 
unequal division. But these arguments were not effective in shifting Gary’s position. He 
reluctantly agreed to nominal maintenance, on his lawyer’s strong advice that the local 
courts considered it ‘almost a prerequisite’ where there were young children involved, but 
he could not see any unfairness in the division of assets, and threatened to seek equal 
shared residence of the children if forced to share his pension. In the end, and despite there 
being a break in the session for Sandra’s lawyer to speak to her separately (presumably to 
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reinforce her strong legal position) it was Sandra who gave in, displaying elements of 
pragmatism and sacrifice in acknowledging that Gary was adamant and would not change 
his mind, insisting that she had enough to meet her needs, and being prepared to agree to 
finalise matters and keep the peace.  
The moderate-to-significantly interventionist group was comprised of mediators and 
solicitors. These practitioners acted as ‘norm educators’ in actively giving legal advice or 
information, equipping clients with knowledge of legal norms which might differ from and 
potentially trump clients’ personal norms. Mediators, for example, would give information 
on the factors the court might take into account when deciding a financial settlement, or 
guide parties as to the parameters of legal acceptability for the purposes of a consent order. 
A few mediators said that if they thought a person was giving too much away due to guilt, 
they would try to steer them away by warning that the court may not ratify their 
agreement, and/or express their reservations in the final MOU. Mediators also routinely 
referred clients for legal advice. This is one area where LASPO will have changed the 
situation, since the option of parties obtaining legal advice alongside mediation is now 
considerably less available to those reliant on legal aid, which may place more onus on 
mediators to provide legal information at the outset in order to inform parties’ decision-
making.17 
In our recorded mediation sessions, we observed a notable contrast between the 
cases concerning children’s matters and financial matters. The former contained few if any 
references to the law, legal principles, courts or judges. By contrast, the financial mediation 
case we recorded was saturated with law. Its structure, content and goals were all legally 
17 See also Hitchings and Miles, above n 5. 
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determined. Unlike the children’s mediations, which involved fairly free-flowing discussions 
of the issues raised by the parents, the financial mediation was tightly structured by the 
mediator and followed the legally necessary steps of disclosure of assets and income, 
determination of expenses and future needs, determination of the basic principle of 
division, and decisions about the distribution of assets to effect that division. The content 
included both extensive legal information and urgings to obtain legal advice. And the goal 
was to reach an agreement which could be turned into a consent order by a solicitor, which 
in turn meant that the terms of the agreement had to be within the bounds of acceptability 
by a court.18 As a general proposition in England and Wales, court orders are available, 
encouraged and positively desirable in financial cases, but not in children’s cases.19 The 
need to persuade the court to ratify a consent order thus exerts a certain discipline in terms 
of both the procedure followed (disclosure, legal information) and the outcome proposed 
(in accordance with legal principles).  
The majority of mediators said they would be concerned that proposed agreements 
fell within the parameters of what a court might decide. If a proposed agreement fell 
outside this ambit, they would provide information about what courts have laid down as fair 
and appropriate in similar circumstances, explore other possible options, reality test and 
discuss the practical implications, recommend legal advice and/or flag their concerns to the 
18 See also Mavis Maclean and John Eekelaar, Lawyers and Mediators: The Brave New World of 
Services for Separating Families (Hart Publishing, 2016) 97, 112-13, 115. 
19 The Children Act 1989 includes s 1(5), the no-order principle, which requires that a court should 
only make an order in a children’s matter if it considers that to do so would be better for the child 
than making no order. Received wisdom holds that it is better for the child for parents to agree 
between themselves and to have self-determined, informal and flexible arrangements rather than 
having child arrangements imposed by court order. Thus, where arrangements have been agreed in 
mediation (which in England is predominantly community-based and occurs prior to any appearance 
in court), it is not normally considered necessary or desirable to turn them into a formal consent 
order. 
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parties’ solicitors in the MOU.20 Some noted their duty under the Resolution Code to point 
out to the parties that their proposed agreement may not be accepted by a court.21 Clearly, 
the existence of judicial discretion and the notion of legal parameters provides a way of 
reconciling party autonomy with the shadow of the law: autonomy can still be honoured 
within a finite range of possibilities. As such, it resolves a particular problem in the theory 
and practice of family mediation, that of adhering to the principle of neutrality as to 
outcomes while ensuring that outcomes promote children’s welfare22 and can survive 
judicial scrutiny.  It is thus perhaps not surprising that so many mediators espoused the 
‘legal parameters’ approach. 
Finally, the directive group were mainly solicitors engaged in traditional negotiations. 
They were generally agreed that the primary role of a lawyer in solicitor negotiations is to 
explain the law applying to the client’s dispute and how that dispute might be decided by a 
court. Advice about the law and legal process could be used both to deflate clients’ 
unreasonable expectations and to protect clients from selling themselves short. Solicitors 
20 See also Maclean and Eekelaar, above n 15, 101. 
21 Resolution is an association of solicitors and other family justice professionals committed to non-
adversarial approaches to the practice of family law. The association provides training for 
practitioners in both mediation and collaborative law, and the Code of Conduct for mediator 
members of Resolution at the time of the research included this duty. The Resolution Code of 
Conduct has subsequently been replaced by the Family Mediation Council’s Code of Practice for 
Family Mediators (September 2016), which does not include the same duty. Rather, the Code 
specifies that ‘The Mediator must not seek to impose any preferred outcome on Participants, or to 
influence them to adopt it, whether by attempting to predict the outcome of court proceedings or 
otherwise. However, if the Participants consent, the Mediator may inform them (if it be the case) 
that he or she considers that the resolutions they are considering might fall outside the parameters 
which a court might approve or order’ [5.3]: https://www.familymediationcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/FMC-Code-of-Practice-September-2016-2.pdf, accessed 26 January 2018. 
22 See Robert E Emery, ‘Re-negotiating Family Relationships: Divorce, Child Custody and Mediation 
(Guildford Press, 2nd edn, 2012) 140; David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall, ‘Selective Facilitation: 
Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators’ (1989) 23 Law and Society 
Review 613, 615. In England and Wales this is relevant in financial as well as children disputes. 
Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that in making financial orders, the court 
must give first consideration to the welfare of any child of the family aged under 18. 
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mentioned managing parties’ expectations by reference to what a judge would be likely to 
order. For example, where one party was motivated by a desire to punish the other for their 
behaviour in ending the relationship, solicitors said they would educate clients that the 
courts view conduct and the circumstances of the relationship breakdown as irrelevant to 
financial outcomes.23 Conversely, if a client was motivated by guilt over their own behaviour 
in ending the relationship, solicitors would give them clear advice about how the court 
would approach the matter and the likely outcome if the case was to go before a judge. For 
example in recorded solicitor-client interview 205, the client, Geoffrey Parsons, was 
separating from his civil partner after a six-year relationship in which he had contributed 
around 80 per cent of the cost of their jointly-owned home. The home was now mortgage 
free and sufficiently valuable to enable them both to rehouse with half the proceeds, 
however the client wanted to offer more to assuage his feelings of responsibility for the 
relationship’s demise. 
Caroline Underwood (solicitor)  
I think the way the court would approach it is that that is in joint names and he 
needs to start again and he is not that young and his income is pretty low so his 
mortgage capacity is very low.  So I think rather than looking at where that came 
from and of course it all came from you, he actually needs half. 
Geoffrey Parsons 
I’ve got no problems with that. 
23 Section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that conduct is a factor to be taken 
into account in making financial orders only ‘if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of 
the court be inequitable to disregard it’. This has been interpreted as imposing a high threshold of 
egregious behaviour. See, e.g. K v K (Conduct) [1990] 2 FLR 225 (alcohol abuse and degradation of 
family finances); Whiston v Whiston [1995] Fam 198 (bigamy); J v S-T (formerly J) [1998] Fam 103 
(non-disclosure of transgender status); K v L [2010] EWCA Civ 125 (sexual abuse of grandchildren); cf 
H v H (Financial Relief: Attempted Murder as Conduct) [2006] 1 FLR 990 (attempted murder of wife 
treated as a ‘magnifying factor’ in the wife’s claim rather than as the husband’s conduct per se). 
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Caroline Underwood 
But he doesn’t need more than half. 
Geoffrey Parsons 
That's it, I have got no problems.  The way I was looking at it was that I thought they 




To give him that little bit extra. 
Caroline Underwood 
I don't think so because I think if you tell me…he can rehouse. …. 
Geoffrey Parsons 
It’s not a house and it’s not necessarily got a garden. 
Caroline Underwood 
It doesn’t have to be, it’s a one bedroom flat we are talking about. 
Solicitors engaged in traditional negotiations tended to place less emphasis on the 
range of possible outcomes and more on benchmarking proposed agreements against what 
a court would be likely to order. This was expressed not necessarily as a matter of choice for 
the parties but as an indicator of the solicitor’s own professional competence. Indeed, one 
solicitor demonstrated her positional orientation by saying that an even better outcome 
would be if she could get more for her client than the court would be likely to order, if she 
could ‘exceed the parameters’ or ‘beat the curve’ (Francesca Lamont), while another 
described his role in a negotiated cases as ‘a hired gun. You are there to get the most, you 
know, the best deal for your client...’ (John Astwood). 
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When it comes to the shadow of the law, then, there appear to be differences 
between dispute resolution processes, as well as variations within each process depending 
on the individual practitioner.24  Overall, the law cast the deepest and most extensive 
shadow over solicitor negotiations. It cast a lighter but still clearly discernible shadow over 
mediation, more so in financial than in children’s cases.  At the time of our research, 
solicitors played an important role in helping to bring the shadow of the law to bear on 
mediation, by giving advice before or alongside the mediation process, checking agreements 
were fair and drawing up consent orders; and mediators relied on them to do so, especially 
where they had reservations about the agreement. This role, however, has been 
substantially diminished by the LASPO legal aid reforms, with the possible result that the 
law has become less normative in mediation. 
 Finally, the shadow of the law appeared to fall most lightly of all on collaborative law 
processes and collaborative lawyers displayed the greatest level of adherence to the value 
of party autonomy. The commitment to party autonomy, the norms of co-operation and the 
lack of a credible threat of court proceedings in collaborative law,25 however, could have the 
consequence that power dynamics between the parties went unchecked and a vulnerable 
party was not protected. Similarly, the exaggerated representation of judicial discretion in 
24 Cf Emma Hitchings, ‘Official, Operative and Outsider Justice: The Ties That (May Not) Bind in 
Family Financial Disputes’ (2017) 29 Child and Family Law Quarterly 359, who advances an argument 
based on distinctions between processes, but does not allow for practitioner variation within 
processes. 
25 The hallmark of the collaborative law process is that both parties and their lawyers sign a 
participation agreement in which they all agree that if either party decides to initiate court 
proceedings, both of the lawyers will cease to act. This is intended to act as a strong incentive to 
cooperation by increasing the cost to both parties and their lawyers of failing to reach an agreement. 
But where one party seeks to exploit a more powerful position in order to gain an unfair advantage 
in negotiations, the other party’s ability to call their bluff and take them to court is significantly 
restricted by the cost of doing so (including the cost of finding another lawyer).  
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order to encourage out-of-court settlement could also deprive less powerful parties of 
important legal support. 
 
The encounter between parties’ norms and the shadow of the law 
Where both parties shared the same norms, whether of formal equality or the needs of the 
primary carer, the matter almost inevitably resolved with that outcome, regardless of how 
the case may have been decided by a court.  In situations of norm disparity or norm 
conflicts, however, three possible outcomes were observed. One was that the parties 
reached a compromise, which split the difference between them in a way which generally 
fell within the parameters of legal possibility, although may not have reflected how a court 
would have actually decided the particular case, and may not have been substantively just.26 
The second was that the practitioner(s) intervened to steer the outcome in accordance with 
the relevant legal norms. The third was that the matter remained unresolved. 
 In terms of practitioner intervention, parties described being steered towards a 
particular outcome in financial cases almost twice as often as they did in children’s cases. 
The parties in our interview sample were considerably more likely to have received advice 
from a solicitor than information from a mediator about appropriate outcomes, including 
solicitors giving advice prior to the parties entering mediation. The largest group here were 
women who felt empowered by the advice they received, not having realised that their non-
financial contributions to the welfare of the family and their role as primary carer would be 
26 Our conception of substantive justice draws on the work of Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: 
Critical Reflections on the Postsocialist Condition (Routledge, 1997).  It requires that financial 
outcomes should not perpetuate relationship-generated disadvantage (redistribution) and should 
appropriately acknowledge and value ongoing care work (recognition). They should provide each 
party with an equal ability to move on with their lives, taking into account all the circumstances and 
the surrounding context. For further analysis, see Barlow et al., Mapping Paths to Family Justice 
(2017) 8-9, 201-2. 
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taken into account in decisions about the division of property. Yet several of the women in 
our party interviews and one in the recorded collaborative process discussed above (204) 
chose to ignore their legal advice and settled for less for reasons of guilt, pragmatism or 
sacrifice. Indeed, one of the collaborative practitioners interviewed noted that he had had 
cases in which men had been keen to use the collaborative process because they perceived 
their wives were feeling guilty, with the implication that the process would therefore deliver 
them a better deal than one in which a solicitor was actively representing the wife’s 
interests (Matthew King). 
 Equally concerning were a group of cases in which women’s lawyers apparently 
failed in their professional obligations to explain their legal position adequately or to pursue 
their financial interests. For example, Jayne’s solicitor did not give her the advice she sought 
before entering mediation about a reasonable percentage split of the assets, and she was 
forced to do her own research on the internet. In solicitor negotiations, Freda’s solicitor did 
not pursue her ex-husband’s pension, and she wished in hindsight that they had. In almost 
half of the (admittedly small number of) collaborative cases in our party and observational 
samples the wife felt insufficiently advised, reached a clean break agreement in 
circumstances in which ongoing spousal maintenance should have been provided for, or 
agreed to a needs-based division which left her with less than half of the assets. 
While some of the norms brought into the dispute resolution process by the parties 
were reflected in outcomes, others tended to be discarded along the way. In financial cases 
husbands succeeded with formal equality and contributions-based arguments, while wives 
succeeded with formal equality and primary carer/needs-based arguments, although as 
indicated, wives’ guilt, pragmatism, sacrifice and self-preservation might also be reflected in 
agreements. Parties’ desires to punish the other party were generally not reflected in 
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settlements, while wives’ arguments for compensation for relationship-generated 
disadvantage do not appear to have been successful. Thus, legal norms did not trump non-
legal norms in any straightforward manner. The non-legal norms of guilt, pragmatism, 
sacrifice and self-preservation could remain in play while the legal norm of compensation 
was universally discarded27 – in all cases, these normative outcomes operated to the 
disadvantage of women. 
The most common patterns of norm disparity and their outcomes in financial cases 
are set out in the following Table: 
Typical norm disparities and outcomes 
Husband’s 
norms 
















/ child welfare 
Compromise on 
















carer’s needs or 
fairness-based 
 
Own needs /  
child welfare 













Notably, only one of the financial cases in which a 50/50 split of the assets was agreed 
(generally on a clean break basis) could be described as a ‘big money’ case, so that equal 
division was likely to take care of each party’s future needs. Moreover, only one of these 
27 This appears also to have occurred in the reported cases. The titles of articles commenting on the 
developing case law on compensation are illuminating: Sarah Foreman, ‘Is Compensation a Dead 
Duck?’ (2014) 44 Family Law 1025; Valentine Le Grice, ‘Compensation: A Dead Parrot or a Sleeping 
Beauty?’ (2018) 48 Family Law 48.  
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cases also had an equal shared care arrangement for the children. In a number of these 
cases, the equal division of moderate assets took place in the context of conventional 
residence/contact arrangements for the children, and are therefore likely to have left the 
primary carer and the children insufficiently provided for. Equal division did not compensate 
the primary carer for relationship-generated economic disadvantage, take into account the 
greater costs of child care to be incurred by the primary carer, or provide each party with an 
equal ability to move on with their lives.  
Agreements reached in mediation were more likely to be based on formal equality, 
either as a result of shared norms or compromise. Agreements reached in the lawyer-led 
processes were more varied, but were more likely to feature needs of the primary carer in 
solicitor negotiations, and contributions in collaborative law. The Table illustrates the 
importance of practitioner intervention in shifting outcomes from a ‘default’ position of 
formal equality or less to one that better served the interests of children and/or the needs 
of the party in the weaker financial position, and in steering outcomes away from 
‘inappropriate’ fault-based or exploitative norms.  The pattern of outcomes between 
dispute resolution processes suggests that this kind of intervention was more likely to occur 
in solicitor negotiations than in either mediation or collaborative law, although it could not 
always be relied upon even in solicitor negotiations. On the other hand, legal norms may 
have only a limited or no role to play when the parties’ initial norms are in agreement.   
 
Conclusion 
This analysis throws up several challenges for potential law reform in relation to financial 
remedies. For the apparently increasing number of parties sorting out their finances without 
practitioner involvement, how can the effects of emotional norms such as punishment, guilt 
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and sacrifice be eliminated or mitigated? How can the message be conveyed that in cases 
where there is more than enough money to go around for the future, equal sharing (rather 
than contributions) should be the norm, while in cases where there is not enough money to 
go around, the future needs of the children and their primary carer should take priority 
(rather than the norms of formal equality and a clean break)? These questions serve as a 
reminder of the virtues of a discretionary system and the disadvantages of bright-line rules.  
Furthermore, in the cases where practitioners continue to be involved, how can it be 
ensured that all of them – collaborative lawyers, mediators and solicitors – actively support 
their clients to meet their future needs and/or to share assets equitably, as well as pursuing 
compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage?  
The two problems identified here do not appear to be remediable by law reform. In 
relation to practitioners, what is needed is not different law but greater commitment to 
using the existing law to ensure outcomes are fair and just to both parties, and specifically 
to women, since our research demonstrates that it is women who are systematically 
disadvantaged. This is a matter for education and training, practice cultures, professional 
associations and ultimately professional regulation. In relation to parties making 
arrangements without the assistance of family justice professionals, a potentially more 
satisfactory approach to achieving the objectives of fairness and justice, rather than trying 
to ‘simplify’ the law, would be to develop smart and responsive online tools to help guide 
parties in sorting out their finances after divorce or separation. Such tools would build in the 
legal norms appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case while operating to 
counter punitive or self-defeating personal norms. Thus, they may conceivably assist to 
deliver more consistently fair arrangements more quickly and at lower cost than any of the 
current dispute resolution options. 
